If The MH370 Submerged In The Gulf of Thailand – Additional Points Part 4

如果MH370沉浸在泰国湾 – 附加论点第4部分

Nam Fong (Malaysian)

南方 (马来西亚人)

(K) The Bungled Confusion of Time-Space.

(K) 糊涂的时空误论.

(1) In the preliminary report for MH370 incident, the timeline table for actions taken between 1:38 am and 6:14 am on March 8, was based on recorded communications on direct lines, summarizing the events associated to MH370 after the radar blip disappeared until activation of the Rescue Coordination Centre. Let’s look at the first few events. (a) 1:38:19 am, Ho Chi Min first enquired about MH370, informed KL-ATCC that verbal contact was not established with MH370 and radar target was last seen at BITOD. (b) 1:41:21 am, KL-ATCC informed HCM that after IGARI, MH370 did not return to Lumpur frequency. (c) 1:46:46 am, HCM queried about MH370 again, stating that radar contact was established over IGARI but there was no verbal contact. Ho Chi Minh advised that the observed radar blip disappeared at waypoint BITOD. (d) 1:50:28 am, KL-ATCC queried HCM if any contact with MH370. HCM’s reply was “negative”. The sequence of times and events are incomplete and not in proper arrangement. [Note: the radar blip disappeared at 1:21 am; Ho Chi Minh or HCM represents Ho Chi Minh Air Traffic Control Centre]. 

(1) 在MH370事故的初步报告中, 于3月8日凌晨1时38分和凌晨6时14分之间所采取行动的时间表, 是根据直线记录的通话, 概述雷达咇声消失后到搜救协调中心的启动与MH370关连的事项. 让我们看看前几个事项. (a)凌晨1时38分19秒, 胡志明(航空交通管理中心)首次查询MH370, 通知吉隆坡航空交通管理中心没有取得与MH370的口头联系以及最后见到的雷达目标是在“比托”. (b)凌晨1时41分21秒, 吉隆坡航空交通管理中心通知胡志明在伊嘎里过后, MH370就没有回复隆坡频率. (c) 凌晨1时46分46秒, 胡志明再次查询MH370, 声称在伊嘎里有取得雷达联系不过没有口头联系. 胡志明劝说其观测到的雷达咇声在比托航点消失. (d)凌晨1时50分28秒, 吉隆坡航空交通管理中心查询胡志明若有MH370的任何联系. 胡志明的回答是“否定的”. [注: 雷达咇声是在凌晨1时21分消失; 胡志明代表胡志明航空交通管理中心].  

(2) Let me begin discussion with the new location mentioned in the preliminary report, the Waypoint BITOD, its coordinates is 7^o5’24”N, 104^o7’6”E (i.e. 7.1^oN and 104.1^oE), which means it is on the east of Waypoint IGARI (6.95^oN and 103.58^oE), slightly tended to the north, distance about 58 km between the two waypoints. If the aircraft was travelling at a speed of 850 km/h, it would take only about 4 minutes from IGARI to BITOD. The Malaysian authority claimed that the MH370 lost from radar at IGARI at 1.21 am, but the Vietnamese authority claimed that it disappeared from radar at BITOD, however the exact time is not mentioned in the preliminary report. So, there is contradiction between the data provided by KL-ATCC and HCM-ATCC, because the disappearance of an aircraft must be exactly at the identical one time and one location, otherwise you may say the precision of their radars is doubtful. Therefore in my previous articles I only regarded the waypoint coordinates as approximate reference, so the times also could have an error of plus minus 2 minutes or slightly more, similarly for the distances too must be also approximated accordingly, but overall the approximation should not affect the logical basis.  

(2) 让我从初步报告里提及的新位置开始讨论, 比托航点, 其经纬度是北纬7度5分24秒, 东经104度7分6秒(既北纬7.1度和东经104.1度), 那就意味它是在伊嘎里(北纬6.95度和东经103.58度)的东边, 稍微偏北, 两个航点之间的距离是大约58公里. 如果该飞机以850公里的时速航行, 从伊嘎里到比托只需约4分钟. 马来西亚当局称MH370于凌晨1时21分在伊嘎里从雷达上消失, 但是越南当局则称它是在比托从雷达上消失, 不过其准确的时间没在初步报告里提及. 因此, 由吉隆坡空管和胡志明空管提供的数据有相互矛盾, 因为一架飞机的消失必须是在准确和完全相同的一个时间和一个地点, 不然你就可能说是他们的雷达的准确性值得怀疑. 所以在我之前的文章我将航点的经纬度只当着是大概的参考, 而且时间也是应该有加减2分钟或稍微多些的误差, 同样的距离也必须相应地估计, 但整体上近似法不应影响逻辑基础.

(3) So, where was the location of lost contact? If take the centre point between IGARI and BITOD as the location of lost contact, then the time available for the aircraft to turn back and flew across peninsular Malaysia would be lesser (i.e. less than 40.5 minutes), in other words the speed required by aircraft would exceed its normal high speed, and thus not viable. That is to say either one or both are impossible: for MH370 to fly across peninsular Malaysia, or MH370 deviated to the right off the normal flight path. If the MH370 flew through this central point and continued flying forward, Mike McKay should have observed lateral motion of the aircraft or fireball, instead of what he believed was to the west. Similarly, Kelantan people and fishermen should see the aircraft moving to the east and not to the north. Under such situation, I think the visual sightings cannot be ignored, because they could be more reliable than the electronic detection or digital record.      

(3) 那么, 失联的位置是在那里? 如果取伊嘎里和比托的中间点当做是失联的位置, 那么所剩的时间让飞机转头和飞越半岛马来西亚就比较少了(既是少过40.5分钟), 换句话说飞机所需的速度就会超过它的正常高速, 因此是行不通的. 那就是说其中之一或两者都不可能: MH370飞越过半岛马来西亚, 或MH370向右偏离正常航道. 如果MH370飞行经过这个中间地点以及继续向前飞行, 麦克墨凯就应该观察到飞机或火球的横向移动, 而不是他所相信的向西而去. 同样的, 吉兰丹人和渔民应该看到该飞机向东而不是向北移动. 在这样的情况下, 我认为视觉目击不可被忽略, 因为他们可能比起电子探测或数码记录更加可靠.

(4) Then, why on May 1 the British marine archaeologist, Timothy Akers, claimed that he has located wreckage from the missing MH370, in an area off the coast of Vietnam? If those are truly debris of MH370, that would absolutely confirm the MH370 is in the east side of peninsular Malaysia, but about the location it went into the sea, I remain the belief that the aircraft went off its normal flight path then moved to the northwest direction. After more than 50 days, debris floated over 500 km to the east and southeast is not impossible.  

(4)那么, 为什么于5月1日英国海洋考古学家, 提莫迪埃克斯, 声称他找到失踪MH370的残骸, 在越南的对开海域? 如果那些真的是MH370 的碎片, 那就可绝对的证实MH370 是在半岛马来西亚的东边, 不过关于它进入海里的位置, 我保持相信该飞机离开它的正常航道后向西北方向移动. 经过50多天以后, 碎片漂移超过500公里到东部或东南部不是不可能的.

(5) Actually, even the investigators and Malaysian authorities are not absolutely sure where is the exact location when MH370 disappeared from radar, what they know now is: at 1:21:04 am, MH370 was observed on the radar screen at KL-ATCC as it passed over waypoint IGARI; at 1:21:13 am the radar label for MH370 disappeared from the radar screen. That means, the location MH370 disappeared from radar screen is not precisely on the point of 6.95^oN and 103.58^oE for the waypoint IGARI, but in an area around it.

(5) 其实, 就连那些调查员和马来西亚当局也不绝对肯定MH370从雷达上消失的确实位置在那里, 他们现在知道的是: 于凌晨1时21分零4秒, 在吉隆坡空管的雷达屏幕上观测到MH370经过伊嘎里航点; 于凌晨1时21分13秒, MH370的雷达标签在雷达屏幕上消失. 那就是说, MH370从雷达屏幕上消失的位置不是准确的在伊嘎里航点的北纬6.95度和东经103.58度, 而是其周围的一个区域.

(6) For the times mentioned above, MH370 was observed at 1:21:04 am, and the MH370 disappeared at 1:21:13 am, as given in the preliminary report, it means something like: you see it now and then you don’t after 9 seconds. I believe the times and events given were determined by inspection or extrapolation of the radar record playback, otherwise the KL-ATCC could have immediately realized the missing incident at 1:21 am, and not until HCM-ATCC informed them then only they know about MH370 was missing.

(6)上面所提及的时间, MH370 于凌晨1时21分零4秒被观测到, 和MH370在凌晨1时21分13秒消失, 如初步报告所提供的, 它就意味着好像: 你现在看到了, 然后9秒钟后你看不着了. 我相信该被提供的时间和事项是从雷达记录重播的检察或外推法来测定的, 不然的话吉隆坡空管应该在凌晨1时21分就即刻发觉失踪事故了, 而不需等到胡志明空管通知后他们才知道MH370失踪了.

 (7) The 17 minutes gap has also become an issue of argument, that is the time between MH370 disappeared from the radar screen of KL-ATCC at 1:21:13 am and the time 1:38:19 am HCM-ATCC informed KL-ATCC that verbal contact was not established with MH370. I think there is only a simple miss linking made by the investigator authorities. The so-called last civil radar point at 1:22 am (as in the diagram released together with the preliminary report), it is supposed to be same with the time 1:21:13 am when the aircraft disappeared from civil radar screen, it does not mean the aircraft was outside the coverage range of the radar, also supposed it is the time the transponder disfunction. It seemed that this time is worked out in later days, otherwise the KL-ATCC should know MH370 was missing at time, and not until HCM-ATCC to informed them at 1:38:19 am.

 (7)那个17分钟的间隔也已成为一个具争论性的议题, 那是MH370从吉隆坡空管的雷达屏幕于凌晨1时21分13秒消失与凌晨1时38分19秒胡志明空管通知吉隆坡空管既和MH370没取得口头联系的时段. 我想那只是调查当局弄成的一个简单错误连接. 那个所谓的最后民用雷达点是在凌晨1时22分(既如与初步报告一起公布的图表里的), 它应该是和凌晨1时21分13秒当飞机从民用雷达屏幕消失的时间相同的, 它不意味飞机是在雷达的覆盖范围之外, 也想它就是异频通讯发放机失灵的时间吧. 看来这个时间像是后来几天才查出来的, 不然的话吉隆坡空管应该在当时就知道MH370 失踪了, 而不是到凌晨1时38分19秒胡志明空管通知他们.

(8) As reported in the preliminary report: “At 01:19:24, LUMPUR RADAR at KLATCC instructed MH370 to contact Ho Chi Minh ATCC on radio frequency 120.9 MHz, MH370 acknowledged with “good night Malaysian Three Seven Zero”, “At 01:21:04, MH370 was observed on the radar screen at KLATCC as it passed over waypoint IGARI. At 01:21:13 the radar label for MH370 disappeared from radar screen at LUMPUR RADAR KLATCC”. So, the appearance and disappearance of MH370 on the radar screen was being observed or not being observed by the radar operators at that times? If radar screen had been observed at 1:21 am, it means at that time should be the KLATCC first one realized MH370 was disappeared, not the HCM-ATCC. If that was the case, the KL-ATCC should have enquired HCM-ATCC to contact the MH370 within 5 minutes.

(8)既如初步报告所报道: “于凌晨1时19分24秒, 吉隆坡空管的隆坡雷达指示MH370联络胡志明空管, 用无线频率120.9 兆赫兹, MH370答以“晚安马来西亚的370”, “于凌晨1时21分零4秒, 在吉隆坡空管的雷达屏幕上观测到MH370经过伊嘎里航点. 在凌晨1时21分13秒, MH370的雷达标签在隆坡雷达屏幕上消失”. 因此,  MH370在雷达屏幕上的出现和消失有被雷达操控员观察还是没被观察着? 如果雷达屏幕在凌晨1时21分有被观察着, 那表示那时候应该是吉隆坡空管第一个发觉MH370失踪了, 而不是胡志明空管. 如果事情是那样的话, 吉隆坡空管应该在5分钟内就向胡志明空管查询联络MH370.  

(9) After the KL-ATCC instructed MH370 to contact Ho Chi Minh ATCC at 01:19:24 am, something happened must be a sudden incident at about 1:21 am, that causing MH370 pilots unable to contact KL-ATCC and HCM-ATCC, because all communication systems were not functioning. So, HCM-ATCC did not receive contact from MH370 as expected in schedule, more likely they would think it was delay, and less likely they aware MH370 was encountering incident and went missing, as they thought the aircraft was yet to enter the Vietnamese airspace. (Note: earlier on March 11, the Vietnam official announced that there was 2 minutes before the aircraft entered its airspace).

(9) 于凌晨1时19分24秒吉隆坡空管指示MH370联络胡志明空管之后, 大约于凌晨1时21分发生一些必定是突发的事故, 那造成MH370飞机的机师无法联络吉隆坡空管和胡志明空管, 因为全部联络系统都不能操作了. 因此, 胡志明空管没有收到预期中MH370的联系, 比较可能的是他们以为它延迟了, 比较不可能的是他们意识MH370遭遇事故而失踪了, 因为他们可想象的是飞机还没进入越南的领空. (注: 早于3月11日, 越南官方宣布还有2分钟该飞机才进入其领空).

(10) Remember the MAS Narita Flight’s pilot who claimed in the New Sunday Times on March 9 that, minutes after informed by the Vietnam ATC (i.e. HCM-ATCC), and just after 1:30 am he established contact with the MH370, “minutes” here could be as short as 2 minutes to 3 minutes or longer, that means the Vietnam had taken action and tried to locate the MH370 through the Narita Flight as early as 1:28 am or even earlier, before that certainly the HCM-ATCC itself had tried to contact the MH370 but unsuccessful (otherwise it would not ask for help), that could be as soon as 1:25 am to 1:26 am. After disconnection with MH370, the Narita Flight’s pilot had tried again to reestablish contact with the MH370 but unsuccessful, he thought that could be normal situation encountered by aviation, by then the time could be already 1.33 am – 1.36 am or later. By the time he replied to HCM-ATCC might be already after 1.38 am, that is why when the HCM-ATCC responded to KL-ATC at 1.38 am, claimed that contact with MH370 was not established yet, whereas at 1:46:46 am responded to KL-ATCC stating radar contact was established over IGARI. The step by step action by the HCM-ATCC seemed that it was unlikely delay in response.

(10)记得那架马航的成田航机的机师于3月9日的新周日时报称道, 越南空管(既胡志明空管)通知后数分钟, 以及刚刚过了凌晨1时30分, 他和MH370联络上了, 这里的“数分钟”可以短到2至3分钟或更久, 那就表示越南当局早在凌晨1时28分或更早前就已采取行动并尝试通过成田航机来找MH370的位置, 在那之前当然胡志明空管自己已尝试过联络MH370(不然它就不会要求协助), 那可能早至凌晨1时25分到凌晨1时26分. 和MH370断了联系后, 成田航机的机师曾再尝试与MH370重新联络不过不成功, 他以为那是航空所遭遇的正常状况, 那时候应该是凌晨1时33分到凌晨1时36分或迟些了, 当他回复胡志明空管时可能已经是凌晨1时38分之后了, 那就是为什么当凌晨1时38分胡志明空管回应吉隆坡空管时, 声称和MH370还没取得联络, 而于凌晨1时46分46秒回复吉隆坡空管时却称在伊嘎里取得了雷达联络. 这样一步一步的胡志明空管的行动看来就不像是反应怠慢.  

 (11) What you have seen is the ATCCs encountering dilemma in determining the exact time and location coordinates, those should be done immediately within a day after incident. Unfortunately, even the world-class investigators are yet to be able in straightening out the time-space discrepancy. 

(11) 你所见到的是航空交通管理中心在测定确实的时间和位置经纬度上遭遇了困境, 那些应该是在事故发生后一天内就即刻办好的. 不幸的, 就连世界级的调查员还未有能力将时间空间的误差给厘清.  

Please keep an eye on next week publication that I will propose new argument to debunk the ping signals that were used in developing the Indian Ocean cruise theory. 

请留意下星期的发表我将提出最新论点以推翻那个用来塑造印度洋理论的频音信号.